

(Fully translated)

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To: Our Dear Shaykh, ((Abu 'Abdallah)), may God keep him and look after him and gird him and guide him and instill wisdom in his words and his deeds, that it may fill his heart, amen.

Peace be upon you, and God's mercy and His blessings,

Praise be to God that you are well. We have received your latest messages on Thursday, 3 Sha'ban (TN: year unspecified), and we had previously prepared that which you are reading now.

These are some of the points that we can write about at present, based on your last message; there are others that will wait for another opportunity, may God assist us.

1. Regarding Yemen, dear Shaykh, what you have said is good and deep, and we ask God to increase your understanding, wisdom, and guidance. I bring you good news that has made us joyful, and we consider it a result of what God has given you and us of His wisdom, accuracy, justice, and prudence, as well as strength of aim and fire. But I would ask that you focus on the current reality in its details, which is that the war has become a reality. And what is war other than that which you have known and experienced? War in its beginning

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is youth. But now we are faced with the reality of how to proceed wisely while including our youth and our men. I'm not saying that we should be weak in front of our popular base or make concessions for them. In fact, we should lead them and take them by their hands toward maturity, God willing. But this is a fluid operation of the utmost difficulty, so let us focus on the operational mechanisms by which we can apply what you mentioned - and thank you for that. So the issue is: Do we strike the Americans or the apostates? We have expressed to you our opinion on the matter, and you know better than we do. As well, the issue of exiting the battlefield entirely is a dangerous and risky thing. Saying that we should not escalate, as it seems to

me, is ambiguous and will not be practical. The young men want "the line" and "the operations." Every day, there are recommendations to the leadership for operations, opportunities, and observation (surveillance and reconnaissance). Thus, there need to be clear and definitive orders. The issue of leaving the southerners, for example (the movement) (TN: the Southern Secessionist Movement), or others to take over governing, given what you have mentioned, causes me to hesitate. Perhaps

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there is another option, which is: Instability and chaos. This is better than the control of apostate infidels.

At any rate, I will begin by writing to ((Abu Basir)) to pave the way for this strategy in general terms, God willing. I ask that God guides me to that which is right and good and sound. Perhaps ((Abu Muhammad))'s letters to you include discussion of this issue, which can help inform your opinion.

In summary: Are brothers are now engaged in an actual war with the government, and of course with the Americans? They have even begun striking the security headquarters, as you have heard, even a few days ago in Abyan. Is it appropriate for us to say, "Stop the escalation. We don't want a war in Yemen!?" I do not support such a position, and all my brothers here, as they have told you of their opinions, do not support it. We believe it to be a fundamental mistake. So do we push in the direction of a ceasefire? How, and what would the conditions of that be? (We should enter into the details of such an idea and grant it permission. We then explain to them our strategy and relay to them all of what you said when you wrote, etc.) We should

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respond to the questions: Would the Americans and Saudis be satisfied with a ceasefire in the first place? And what will become of our brothers who are committed to the ceasefire? Anyway, I have attached the most recent letters from Abu Basir, but there were one or two messages before these. He promised - and I wrote to him asking him to be quick about it - to send detailed messages about their status.

2. Dear Shaykh, the brothers in Somalia are waiting for a message from you and for orders, and they also await

consultation and settlement in the matters that they brought up. It would be nice if you could do something especially for them that we could convey to them to make them happy.

3. I want to give you the good news that Shaykh Abu Muhammad is well and in good health. His family is with him, as is one of the Arab brothers. We ask God to keep them concealed, to keep them well, and to bless them. I have attached his letters, which have been waiting for a while. He issued a statement on the passing of Shaykh Sa'id, and before that he had sent us a statement about Turkey. We held these up because disseminating them wasn't appropriate at the time we received them due to their coinciding with the saga of the Freedom Flotilla

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and its tragic end, in addition to the sympathy of the Turkish people to the matter and the position of the Turkish government, etc. After consulting with Abu Muhammad, we cancelled publication of the statements altogether. This is something I had wanted to mention to you.

4. With regard to what happened with al-Hafiz, I had written to you about it, God rest his soul. As for his children, they are fine and doing well, and I was to reassure you that we are looking after them and guiding them and their families. I have given them money and other assistance, and I have pledged to help his other, Sudanese family. God willing, we are still expanding our assistance to them, giving them gifts, and standing beside them. They have asked me for nothing that I have not answered with "yes," even their father's weapon (which was a non-specific weapon from the general use stock, a Krinkov). (('Abd-al-Rahman)) told me that he wanted it to remain with him, so I left it there for four months, and then we will see. Maybe I will allow them to keep it. The Shaykh had written in his will that his weapon was to return to the general use stock, and he stipulated this in his will. They know this, but they wanted to keep it with them. I renewed the vehicle for 'Abd-al-Rahman, and they are all still doing the work that he left for them. In fact, I have increased 'Abdallah's stature and his tasks, may God assist in that. 'Abdallah (with us, we use the name Muhammad ((Khan))), but he is also known as ((Muslim))) has become one of our military leadership figures, and Lord have mercy, he is a lion. 'Abd-al-Rahman is following in his footsteps (he works in

Special Tasks and belongs to the security committee). Usamah is still young, and he is about to go to Pakistan with his sister, Umm ((Hafsah)), for her treatment. We ask God to heal her and treat her heart.

5. Shaykh ((Yunis)) (Var.: ((Younis))) is still present. As you see, we wrote to you and we are waiting for clear and final permission. Once we get that, we will tell him to move, when he is ready, with God's help. I will record his complete CV, God willing, and tell him about the message.

6. Shaykh ((Ilyas)): God willing, I'll inform him of what you mentioned myself and explain it to him. He has sent you the attached messages, as you can see. I met him recently, and he is doing well. You should write him a letter.

7. With regard to the operation in Lahore against the polytheist Barelvīs, we have alerted our brothers, and I personally alerted Hekmatullah ((Mahsud)) that he must declare that they "had no connection to it," and that our method with these errant sects is "to proselytize with wisdom, sound preaching, and explanation." I was insistent upon this particular wording, praise be to God.

8. With regard to the negotiation, Esteemed Shaykh, I would briefly say, with God's help, that the Pakistani enemy has begun to correspond with us and with the (TN: Pakistani) Taliban ((Hakimullah)), ever since al-Hafiz, God rest his soul. We were consulting back and forth, and then we shared some consultation with Abu Muhammad recently when we resumed correspondence with him. Our stance was essentially: We are ready to quit the fight with you, as our battle is primarily with the Americans; however, you entered into it with them. If you leave us alone, then we will leave you alone. But otherwise, we are men, and you will see something that will astonish you, and God is with us.

We leaked information (via Siraj ((Haqqani)), and with the help of the Mahsud brothers and others, via their communications) that al-Qa'ida and the Pakistani Taliban were preparing large-scale, destructive operations in Pakistan, but that the groups' leadership had halted the operations in an attempt to calm the situation and absorb the pressure from the Americans. But if

Pakistan were to direct its evils against the Mujahidin in Waziristan, then the operations would move forward, including very large operations that were ready and would occur in the heart of Pakistan (this is the gist of the information we leaked via a number of avenues, and it certainly reached them).

As a result of this, they began sending people to us from the intelligence. They sent messages to us via some of the Pakistani Jihadist groups that they are comfortable with, including the Harakat al-Mujahidin, led by Fadl-al-Rahman ((Khalil)). One of their messengers came to us conveying a message for us from the intelligence leadership, including Shuja' ((Shah)) and others, saying that they wanted to talk to us as al-Qa'ida. So we gave them the same message, nothing more. After a while (about three

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weeks ago), they sent the same man once more. What was noteworthy this time was that they also inserted Hamid ((Gul)) into the meeting, and Fadl-al-Rahman Khalil attended as an advisor. They sent a message saying, "Give us some time, a month and a half or two. We are trying to convince the Americans and pressure them to negotiate with al-Qa'ida, and to convince them as well that negotiating with the Taliban without al-Qa'ida is of no use. Just wait a little bit. If we are able to convince the Americans, then we (meaning the Pakistanis themselves) have no objection to negotiating with you and sitting down with you." So the brothers said to them, "We will inform our command of your message." And only the messenger went.

As for the Taliban movement, Hakimullah and his companion, Qari ((Husayn)), informed me that the Punjabi government (Shah Baz ((Sharif))) had sent them word that they wanted to negotiate with them and that they were ready to agree to an arrangement with them that they would not carry out any acts inside Punjab (in the sphere of control of the government, which does not include Islamabad or Pindi), as well as that they were ready to pay any price, etc. The negotiations were ongoing, according to them. We stressed to them that they should consult with us in all matters, and they promised to do so. In my last meeting with Hakimullah, I asked him, and he said to me, "There is nothing new, and if anything new comes up, we will tell you." I told him what was going on with us, and that we were being very wary of them. Hakim thinks that we should not show ourselves or sit down with them, and I was supportive of this position in principle. I

told him, "At any rate, we don't agree to anything without consulting our leadership, or in reaching an understanding with you."

This is basically a summary of what took place. As you know, this is just talk!

So are the Pakistanis serious, or are they just playing with us? We must be cautious and ready and aware. We must maintain our focus and determination. Of course, they are in a difficult position, as well, and they see their lords and masters, the Americans, in an extremely difficult position, too. This is a government mired in hypocrisy, but there is refuge in God.

So I ask you, what is your opinion? Our opinion, Shaykh, is as I said: We will take advantage of any genuine opportunity for a truce with the Pakistanis so that we can focus wholly on the Americans. This is clear. Yes, there may be difficulty in it for many of our Pakistani brothers; don't forget the brothers in Swat. The Mahsud brothers are our allies and very close comrades,

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as are others, and even the groups that are with us. But with God's help, it is possible to make them understand, and to explain to them the importance of the matter and how good it could be.

9. Our brother, 'Azzam al-((Amriki)) (TN: "the American"), is fine and doing well, praise be to God. The rumor spread by the Pakistanis was false, but we didn't know exactly what was true. Was it a mistake they made, or a suspicion? Or was there a specific ruse behind it?

10. The brothers imprisoned in Iran and their families are fine, God willing. But no one has come so far since Anas al-((Subay'i)), and as I told you, he was the last of the brothers to come. He came alone after his family traveled to Libya via Turkey, via a communiqué to the al-Qadhafi Foundation. God willing, if we're able, we will arrange for the family to come. But Shaykh, perhaps the matter is more difficult than you imagine, in terms of the route and searches between us and Peshawar. For this reason, I think we would prefer to keep them for the time being in a place far from us, where they are safe.

Then we can take our time making arrangements for them, God willing.

11. As for your recommendation regarding your son, ((Hamzah)), I don't know Hamzah. He was young, but he has grown up. Maybe I can ask Brother Nu'man al-((Masri)), who was close to him for a time when they were in prison, I think. If you trust in his steadfastness and his emotional strength, then this is a good recommendation. Maybe God will facilitate his safe exit, and the exit of all the other brothers. How do you think he should get to Qatar? If they get him out, they will send him to us using the well-known smuggling routes, and he will make it here. But how should he go after that? Is it appropriate for him to coordinate with the Qatari embassy in Pakistan, for example? But the Americans will definitely take him! So the matter requires that we study it in detail and be careful and take precautions. Otherwise, if we are able to tell the Iranians to let him go to Qatar, we will try to do that.

12. Searching for an aide-de-camp: I was previously aware of the discussion about the aide-de-camp with al-Hafiz. By the way, I read all your messages to al-Hafiz, God rest his soul, as they came, and we would read them and consult one another about them. Now, I share your messages only with ((Abu Yahya)), and no one else. As for the other brothers, depending on the specific focus or the area in which it is possible to get advice, I will take a portion of the message - perhaps paragraphs - and show it to 'Abd-al-Rahman al-((Maghrebi)) if it pertains to media policy, as an example. If it pertains to external activity, I might show the relevant paragraphs to other brothers. As for the aide-de-camp, I would say that God willing, we will make every effort to search.

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13. We will do what you said regarding the brother in the couriers: We will question him and check his background and his qualifications, may God keep you all. I previously wrote to you my opinion that we should reduce our correspondence. I have another recommendation, which is that we should encrypt our correspondence. Is it possible for the people on your end to learn the Mujahidin Secrets program? I will attach it, along with an explanation of it. Perhaps your assistants can learn it and use it in their correspondence.

14. I will try to search for the book al-Tatarrus (TN: The Barricade), by Shaykh Abu Yahya, and attach a copy to you, along with a few other theories. If I'm unable to find it now, I'll do it another time, with God's help.

15. I want to inform you that Brother Hamzah al-Jawfi, God rest his soul, was killed during an airstrike by spy aircraft in South Waziristan (Wana). Others were killed with him, but we still haven't confirmed exactly who. It's possible that ((Abu-al-Husayn)) al-Masri was among them.

16. God willing, we will request information about ((Abu Bakr)) al-Baghdadi and his deputy, and about the great partisan ((Abu Sulayman)). We will try to ask the partisan brothers and others and get a clearer picture, with God's assistance. God willing, we will continue our efforts toward unity, as we have indeed done. We have written to them in messages of condolence for the two martyred emirs that perhaps this is an opportunity to renew efforts of unity and to find a new structure that combines everything, etc.

17. The idea about a documentary about you, in coordination with Al Jazeera and Al Sahhab, is something we will work at. I will consult with Munir, and we will send the idea to Zaydan and ask for his questions. But I think that your answers should be recorded in audio at a minimum. I had previously asked you, Shaykh, for tapes that we could keep about your history, life, and everything, and about how the idea of Jihad developed with you, etc. Many things. Our brother Munir sent you questions and what not, but you did not respond, so we left the matter for the time being. But I am insisting on this matter, and I think it's something we need to do. Also, Dear Shaykh, some recorded audio of shorts speeches to the brothers here especially, where you could let them hear you without anyone taking a copy of it. We could keep them in our archive or destroy them, per your order. But we should do this for the people, to put them at ease regarding appointments of personnel and other issues, and so you can urge them to listen and obey, to be patient and steadfast, and to raise their awareness and concern. Al-Jawfi, God rest his soul, said, "I am with Usama Bin Laden, but I'm not with Hafiz ((Sultan)), or Khalid al-((Habib)), or ((Mahmud)). Likewise, we have

others who nearly make statements, and those who are not like that. We ask God to help us in that which for us and for you is good.

18. With regard to a media presence, thank you so much for the recommendation. I consulted with the brothers, and we think that at this time, and for the indefinite future, we should not be present in the media, owing to our remaining hidden and to security, and to avoid the monitoring by spies. We are suffering in this war of espionage and absorbing the pressures of the United States and Pakistan. We had the thought of moving outside Waziristan in the near future. Perhaps some of us will go to Nuristan, and others will remain. A section goes and a section stays. As we told you before, we have a good battalion there led by "Faruq al-((Qatari))." He is an esteemed brother from the proven cadre. He recently sent us word that he made things ready there to receive us, and that the locations are good and there are partisans, and everything else. We ask for God's assistance.

19. You had asked that I suggest the names of some prepared brothers so that one might become a deputy of mine. First, I ask God's help in that with which I have been tasked. Shaykh, this is a great responsibility, and I am not equal to it. I fear that I squander, go too far, or lose things. I had asked Shaykh Sa'id in secret to excuse me, in shame, because I was also saying to myself, "Who is for the brothers, the work, and for Jihad, that would have need of me?" We have lost cadre and leaders, as we know, and I fear this may be from the fleeing and the slow progress, etc. At any rate, may God help me as he helps you. I ask God to relieve me and quickly prepare someone better than I to take charge. I would say that I do not think anyone is completely ready to take charge right now, except Shaykh Abu Yahya. And by the way, during the final days of al-Hafiz, Abu Yahya was the second deputy, based on the directive that came from you to designate a second deputy. He is now my deputy, and I think he is the most prepared of the brothers.

However, I am not sold on this, and I hope that I will find another person. The reason is this: I think he should be assigned full time to academics, jurisprudence, fatwas, and climbing the academic ladder. If we busy him with management, I suspect we will lose his knowledge and qualifications. It was asked of our master, 'Umar, "Why not assign one of the senior companions of the Prophet?" His answer was, "I would hate to sully them with work."

The sullyng would be in two senses: First, that they would be subjected to unrest in their minds, which would in turn corrupt their faith. Second, it would harm their dignity in the hearts of the people. Someone in charge is faced with bickering, recriminations, and arguments and such.

Thus, I have always felt that Abu Yahya should be far removed from this. But I haven't found anyone more suited or better than he. In fact, he is better and more deserving than I am.

Of the remaining, Shaykh Yunis still needs to grow up, and needs to become more mature and get more experience. He has a smart and clever mind, God bless him, but one of the biggest problems people like him have is that they are considered new, and people won't be satisfied with him. Anyway, he's already tasked with work that he has begun, may God assist him in it.

A possibility is our brother, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. He has a very sound mindset and a sturdy faith, in our assessment. He has ethics beyond reproach and is secretive and patient. He is sound in his thinking and is very aware. He is suitable for command, God willing, and may God look after him. His only problem will be with the senior people; those who have been around longer than he will hardly accept him (I mean the older shaykhs; you know who I'm talking about). But this could be solved by a clear appointment from you, not in writing, but in an audio recording at the very least. There is no choice other than this in a case such as 'Abd-al-Rahman's, if I had to appoint him. Of course, he is now in charge of Al Sahhab, but he could be removed from that and promoted. Maybe I'm perceiving the matter to be more sensitive than it is. I await your counsel.

In the new generation, there are good brothers and the cadre and leadership of the future, may God strengthen them. We are working to prepare the cadre and ready the leadership. I will bring you good news that will make you happy, with the help of God. But our circumstances are difficult, Shaykh, and we are trying, but this war of espionage has really worn us down.

From the senior Egyptian brothers who remain with us, we have ((Sa'duf)), Amir al-((Fatah)), ((Abu al-Miqdad)), and ((Abu

Sulayman)) (who was living in Khowst with al-Jawfi in the days of the Emirate, driving a taxi). These men are all with us in our work, but most of them are not suited to this matter. Except Abu al-Miqdad, who might be the best of them, and is certainly the best in terms of his ideology and point of view. But there is difficulty when it comes to his ethics.

As far as the Algerian brothers, we have ((Abu 'Uthman)), but he isn't suited for this matter. We have someone better than he, a brother named (('Abd-al-Jalil)), who came to us during the last days of the Emirate. He was put in prison in Kabul by Sayyaf's men, but they released him (there were three of them: Sayf Bin 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman al-((Masri)) and 'Azzam al-((Zahrani)), God rest his soul). This brother is

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good and might be qualified in the near future. We might try him out as a deputy now. I will look into the matter and study it, and then I'll respond to you in another letter. Perhaps you remember, he's the one that al-Hafiz recommended to you previously to be a spokesman for al-Qa'ida.

I ask God to release our brothers who are in prison. They come to help and to carry the burden, and they are good men. Abu Muhammad al-((Zayyat)), ((Abu al-Khayr)), and ((Sayf al-'Adl)), and others. But to be safe, if God ordains their release, they should spend six months (or even a year) getting familiar again with how things work, and so they can renew their contacts, activities, and livelihoods. At present, they are relatively close, and they consult incrementally in matters. After this, they could take on affairs. We ask God to free them and with them, may He bring success for Islam and the Muslims, and may He make them and us suitable servants.

20. Speaking of some problem, though I don't want to occupy you with problems, but perhaps this is something that you should be aware of. I've attached a paragraph that I wrote in a message to brother Abu Basir al-((Wuhayshi)) (he had asked me for a summary of the situation with us).

21. God willing, I will reread the letter slowly and respond to you in the next missive regarding the important paragraphs that I didn't get to here, such as the idea about you issuing a statement in which you say that we are correcting some things

that have come hastily from us. This should be very precise and balanced and studied. We might need to undertake some measured steps before this. Let me assure you, Dear Shaykh, that we are making every effort to refine our course, assess our officials in every location, and communicate with worthy and learned people and religious students and other. We are working hard at this despite all the difficulties (we are in contact with a group of religious students, and I will choose two or three of them, along with one to three educated men, for that which I had indicated, including critiques, scrutiny, and advise for us, and I will tell them that we want to be corrected, etc., as you had mentioned). God willing, this is everything. We will begin this and pave the way for you. We are continually making corrections, even before this, during, and after this, with the help of God, in matters of ideology, excessiveness, extremist, etc. In matters of ethics, taste, and moderation, and in matters of general thought, analysis, research, and Jurisprudence, may God assist us.

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22. There are other attachments: The advise and the sympathy; a long but good article by Abu Yahya entitled "Jihad and the Battle of Uncertainties" (I'm unable to find it, unfortunately); the latest in a series of my articles in the magazine "Vanguards of Khorasan"; media directives; Abu Yahya's message to members of the media.

This is what I am able to respond with. God is great, and makes all things happen for us. He will bring victory soon. Regards.

Mahmud

Saturday, 5 Sha'ban 1431 (TN: 17 July 2010)