

**"A Vision for Intelligence in a Time of Change"  
Remarks/Q&A Presented to the  
Joint Military Intelligence College Conference**

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Good morning everyone, and thank you, Deborah, for that kind introduction. I also want to thank Admiral Jacoby and President Clift for their warm welcome to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Military Intelligence College, and for their efforts on behalf of today's conference.

As you may know, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is scheduled to re-locate to the DIAC in a few months, prior to establishing permanent headquarters of our own. I'm sure the ODNI team will enjoy its stay here, Admiral. And I want to thank you for your gracious hospitality, the DIAC already feels like home.

This morning I would like to take a few minutes to talk to you about our strategic vision for national intelligence, a subject to which I, and my colleagues in the ODNI and the IC leadership have been giving a great deal of thought over the last several months.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, of course, was established by the Intelligence Reform Act which represents the most wide-ranging reform of American intelligence in decades, but just as it went into effect, the WMD Commission reported its own findings, including a list of 74 recommendations to improve United States intelligence. These were excellent recommendations and the President agreed with 70 of them, 70 out of 74 in fact, and asked our office to carry them out.

Now taken together, the Intelligence Reform Act and the WMD Commission's recommendations constitute a powerful force for change in the Intelligence Community. They reflect the fact that our nation's overall security strategy shifted as a result of the events on 11 September 2001 and the needs of the Intelligence Community's principal customers have changed as well.

- The Secretary of Defense, for example, has a remarkably broad set of requirements and priorities. At the outset of the 21st century, the United States military must be equally well prepared to help our coalition partners and the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan counter insurgencies, deter aggression against the homeland and United States allies by hostile states, and support relief efforts in places as distant as Indonesia and as close as New Orleans.
- The Secretary of State shares the Secretary of Defense's concerns about United States interests on a global scale, but from a diplomatic perspective. Middle East peace, North Korea, Iraq, political developments in Central Asia, Africa, and our own hemisphere are just a few major items on her agenda, each requiring highly-focused intelligence support.
- The Attorney General, by contrast, has a different but just as compelling set of needs. The Department of Justice and the FBI are on the front line against terrorist attacks—

from whatever source or motivation—here in the United States. At the same time, federal law enforcement efforts against most traditional criminals cannot rest—especially when activities that appear to be run-of-the-mill criminality may actually be a front or a staging operation for the next terrorist assault on one of our cities.

- The Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide one final example, has yet a fourth set of intelligence needs and priorities. The borders and infrastructure of a nation as large and complex as ours require careful, knowledgeable, and continuous assessment of vulnerability to constantly shifting threats emanating from all corners of the globe.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act demands that our vision for United States national intelligence be broad enough to encompass all of these needs. The United States helped bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. In so doing, we helped knit the world's peoples together through international institutions, travel, communications, and commerce. Nonetheless, the attacks on 9/11 showed that it no longer takes a large, hostile foreign country to assail our citizens and homeland. Suicidal fanatics have fashioned powerful weapons with which to murder thousands of Americans—and they want very much to do so again.

The people of Madrid know this, and the people of London know it, too. We all live in a dangerous world because our adversaries are elusive, tenacious, and determined. The worst specter is that of terrorists obtaining access to real weapons of mass destruction—not commercial aircraft hitting buildings or bombs exploding in subways, but chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, whose immediate and post-strike effects would take a terrible toll on our citizens and institutions alike.

Our national intelligence effort has to place a priority on such threats and rise to meet them, keeping in mind that the world is not all threats—nor are all threats, in their incipient stages, foreordained to succeed in doing us harm. As I said earlier, our national security strategy changed after 9/11, emphasizing pro-active measures the United States can take to defend itself, diplomatically and economically as well as militarily.

The planning, policies, and activities of the Intelligence Community therefore should be organized to provide accurate and timely intelligence that helps us ward off imminent danger, foresee gathering storms, and detect dynamics of change in the world that could be helpful to us rather than harmful. Specifically, and I list a few examples here:

- The Intelligence Community must help the United States and its allies defeat terrorists at home and abroad, and seize the initiative from global extremists;
- We must support American diplomats, commanders, and law enforcement authorities in preventing and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
- We must use our analytic insight to help policymakers bolster the growth of democracy and free markets as a way of sustaining peaceful democratic states;
- We must develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult intelligence targets; and
- And finally, the Intelligence Community must help decision makers anticipate developments of strategic concern, always remembering that opportunities can be as decisive as vulnerabilities in protecting American lives, values, and interests.

Having committed ourselves to these substantive elements of our mission, we must also inquire into what we should do differently to reorient the institutions and processes of the Intelligence Community at a time when traditional national boundaries mean nothing to those who wish us ill.

In our thinking about how the Community must function, it is especially important that we note how fast our enemies adapt to United States policies and actions, and build into our plans a capacity to innovate even faster. This represents a continuous, long-term challenge. It will require us to become a learning community, ready to deal with contingencies, trade-offs, and change.

Particular emphasis must be placed on ensuring that domestic law enforcement and homeland security officials become aware of potential or emerging foreign threats to the homeland. If our customers need more information or have something they want to share with us—whether those customers are state, local, tribal, or federal—we have to organize ourselves to be responsive to their requests and receptive to their concerns.

At the same time, we need to build up our overall analytic expertise, re-balance and optimize our collection capabilities, and work hard to attract and unify a diverse, multi-talented workforce, particularly with regard to foreign languages, science and technology.

Some of this already has begun. The Joint Military Intelligence College, for example, is partnering with the new National Intelligence University system, a network of IC training and leadership programs that my office recently established. The FBI has created the new National Security Branch. The new National Counter-Proliferation Center is building its staff week by week.

But there is much more to be done. We need to develop a new paradigm for security that increases our effectiveness while enabling us to counter the intelligence capabilities of our adversaries. We need to take stock of our foreign intelligence relationships and consider the utility of establishing new ones, and we need to aggressively exploit path breaking scientific and research advances that will enable us to maintain, and, if possible, extend our intelligence advantages against our adversaries.

Doing all of this is going to be demanding. If we are going to fulfill the expectations of Congress and the President, we have our work cut out for us in every dimension of intelligence, requiring that we align, integrate and thereby transform our activities more thoroughly and with more teamwork and imagination than ever before.

Can we succeed?

I believe that we can. Let's remember that the Department of Defense had to answer a similar call after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s. The resulting transformation of the American military was not quick, or painless, but our armed forces today are more unified—more “joint”—and consequently more effective than ever before. The Intelligence Community can do the same.

In my five months as Director of National Intelligence—every single day of those five months—I have been inspired by the hard work, dedication, and the sheer skill of the people who make up the Intelligence Community. They care; they are determined to succeed; and they are as talented a group of people as you could find in any government or corporation anywhere in the world. That is why I'm confident that if we set the right goals and systematically plan and execute this transformation, they will succeed.

And that's critical because over the next fifteen years, we are likely to see as much change and turmoil in the world as we have seen over the last fifteen years. The powerful forces and reactions that have been unleashed by the end of the Cold War—globalization in particular—will continue to startle and sometimes wound us in the decades ahead. Good intelligence—better intelligence—cannot forestall that; but it can help us to deal with it. That's the job at hand: giving the President, the Congress, our military, our diplomats, and our law enforcement officials at all levels insight and foresight, helping them protect American lives, values and allies while contributing to a more democratic and prosperous world.

Thank you very much for your attention. I would be more than pleased to try and answer any questions or solicit any comments you might have.

**Question:** [Inaudible].

One of the predominant features of the IRTPA is the information sharing environment. I think one of the consistent impediments that's discussed across the community are policies that are in place that are impacting the ability to move forward with that.

How do you see that in your charge? What priority do you give that? What plans can you share with us [inaudible]?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** The question is about information sharing and what priority do I give that and what plans.

First of all, I would mention it's a feature of the new legislation. Also [inaudible] an institution called the Information Sharing Executive that was created by separate legislation. That now by presidential decisions has been folded under the umbrella of the DNI [inaudible]. That individual has been [inaudible].

We also will be having a new CIO for DNI coming on board very shortly.

I think the short answer to your question is we're going to assign it very high priority. I think information sharing and getting through the plethora of [inaudible] that we have is one of the big challenges that we face in the intelligence community, and of course it's one of the issues that came under the sharpest scrutiny, if you will, in the wake of 9/11. The failure to connect the dots to the issue of whether information was shared and passed when it should have been.

I think there are some technological issues that have to be dealt with. I think that's [inaudible] coming to grips with. But I think there's also, perhaps equally or more of importance, I'm assured

that many of these obstacles really are not technological, they're cultural, and I think that one has to try to instill a culture of sharing rather than a culture of withholding with, of course, due regard for the protection of highly sensitive sources and methods. But I think that certainly can be squared and I think it goes to the issue of thinking of ourselves more as a community rather than as a set of individual agencies, although each will have its own particular areas of excellence and strengths.

So yes, it will have a lot of priority, and I would extend that to the question of sharing intelligence with our foreign intelligence partners as well, particularly Australia, the UK, Canada, New Zealand, but going beyond that. I think it gets to the question of good risk management.

I think sometimes we've been a bit too categorical in withholding information from our partners and allies who might have been able to put it to good use, but because of some sense of [inaudible] perhaps didn't take quite as much risk as you perhaps ought to have in order to manage whatever threat it was that we're chasing.

So community, risk management, emphasis on sharing, due regard for sources.

**Question:** Relating to the previous question just answered, sir, what are your feelings about establishing a truly unified clearance and access process so that we don't have to have multi people carrying a pound of badges around their neck so you need a chiropractor just to be able to go where they need to go.

**Ambassador Negroponte:** The one nice thing about that is you can always tell who is an intelligence officer in our -- [Laughter.] They carry 15 or 20 badges.

Yeah, what can I say? I can either give you a long treatise or just say yes, we've got to work on that. Will we achieve it during my tenure down to one single one? I don't know. But we're seized with this issue, whether it has to do with access or standards for clearances. There are a lot of issues that go to the question of standards.

What does a clearance mean in one agency versus another? So on and so forth. We've got people in important positions within the DNI who are focused on these very kinds of things and working with their colleagues throughout the intelligence community. It's a challenge, and I'm not going to make exaggerated claims for what can be accomplished in a short period of time. But I think it's, again, a helpful issue. To get people thinking about being part of a broader community, I think the individuals within the separate agencies are themselves going to then start finding solutions to these issues. They themselves are going to come forward and say I know how we can fix that. Believe me. I've watched it happen too often in my life in other situations.

The answer usually is right where the problem is, and people will step forward and tell you how -  
- If they end up appreciating why it is we want to fix it and what advantages can accrue to them as a result of fixing it and to their organization, they themselves will come forward with a solution eventually.

**Question:** As you know, there's a fair amount of contractor support for the intelligence community. What's your view on the quality of the support and the extent of the support? Is it in the places you would like, or would you like to see it in other places?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** It's a very good question, especially since I'm sure that the contractor support numbers in the hundreds if not thousands and lots and lots of federal money is involved, but I personally haven't been in the job long enough to be able to form an opinion or a judgment on that question. I just don't have enough of a sample of experience of my own. But it's something I should keep in mind. I thank you for the question.

**Question:** There's been discussion about a National Proliferation Center and also some discussion about a National Open Source Center, possibly one. Can you share with us schedules, plans or thoughts on these?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Let me just take one step back. I think both in the legislation and even more pertinently in the WMD Commission report conclusions, the idea was to seize upon the idea of creating centers for issues of particular intelligence interest and that these centers should be the focal points, if you will, for every aspect of intelligence with respect to that issue. WMD, for example, or non-proliferation.

What we've settled on for the time being is to not try to create too many of these. My feeling is that it would be disruptive to have a proliferation, if you will, of these intelligence centers, but to focus on a handful. So there are a couple of naturals here. The National Counter-Terrorism Center, and it's already a mission manager, if you will, for counter-terrorism [inaudible]. And we decided because of its importance, we've decided to stand up a National Counter-Proliferation Center, which will be headed by, is headed by Ambassador Ken Brill who was formerly our Ambassador to the IAEA. He's [scheduled] to come on board in that organization, which we expect to have -- I think it will have less than 100 people, but it will be a focal point for a lot of coordinating of the intel work we're doing on non-proliferation.

Apart from those two centers there's a Counter-Intelligence Center already in existence. Then we really decided on the issues of a couple of other intelligence issues not to create actual brick and mortar centers, if you will, but to have mission managers which will be sort of like a virtual notion rather than having them all in one location. We've decided to establish mission manager positions for Iran and North Korea.

But again, all in the spirit of where we think it's necessary and desirable to really maximize a community. These centers of mission manager concepts are going to be applied.

Somebody told me once, just think of the mission manager concept of being what the DNI himself would be doing if he didn't have anything else to do. The issue rises to that level of importance to symbolize the significance we attach to each.

**Question:** Sir, I want to ask about the analysis process. Have you allowed for more than just competing or contrasting analysis? Have you allowed for dissenting analysis? The basic question is --

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Getting analysts to agree is a very hard thing to do. [Laughter.]

**Question:** Maybe the core of the question -- should we allow for analysts to really open and go beyond the risk of fear that prevents an analyst from telling what they really think? Especially if they differ a little bit? If you're in court, you have public defendants that we defend people who have committed crimes. Do you have within the system, should we have within the system a formal dissenting analysis position which we take the position of defending the really bad guy so that the bin Laden analyst can come up with correct arguments?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** -- bin Laden's analysts? [Laughter.]

I think I have an answer to your question which is yes. I mean we have, we may not have gone quite as far as you've suggested, but I think a lot of steps have been taken to make sure that both differing points of view and alternative analysis are served up to our customers, whether it's in the form of right in the analytical piece to explain that analysts have different judgments on a particular issue, and that's done and it's done frequently and we encourage it. And there are also these slightly more formal pieces, the so-called red cell exercises where you get somebody to really game out an alternative point of view.

I think frankly since 9/11 and even more so since the WMD Commission report, we've been seeing quite a bit of that.

My own message to the analytical community is look, you shouldn't drive inexorably towards consensus views on pieces that you do because if you do you serve that up, the policymakers are going to have different views anyway and they're going to debate the alternative views. That's the nature of the way policy is made. So that's on one side.

The only caution I would put on the other side is it doesn't really help policymakers if you present them with a whole scattering of points of view, nor does it help if you have a one view offered and then the agency that you'd expect to have the most knowledge on the issue disagrees. Where does that leave you? Say it's on a particularly, something to do with a piece of military technology or something like that.

So personally I pay quite a bit of attention to whose intelligence agency a particular analytical view is coming from, depending on the subject matter.

So I would say that dissent and alternative views have to be presented in at least a somewhat intellectually disciplined fashion I guess would be the way I'd look at it.

**Question:** Ambassador, do you believe that it is wise policy to restrict foreign students at our universities given the [inaudible] shortages in scientists and engineers of the future? And they will be a good source of our [ambassadors]. And also given that 40 percent of all members of the National Academies are foreign born, and the need for this kind of [inaudible] professionals for our country.

**Ambassador Negroponte:** I'm not sure which kind of restrictions you're talking about. I assume you're referring to visa --

**Question:** Correct.

**Ambassador Negroponte:** I don't think there's any policy on the part of either our government or of our academic institutions to restrict the flow of foreign students. My sense is that most institutions welcome foreign students.

I think there's good news and less good news on this subject, if I may.

We certainly welcome a lot of foreign students to our country. I think it's something on the order of half a million students at any given time doing advanced studies in the United States. The last time I looked at the figure it was something like 40,000 or 50,000 Chinese students, a similar number of Indians studying in the United States, and so forth.

I think since 9/11, definitely with respect particularly to the Middle East it's been much more difficult, the processing of visas has been much more difficult, to the point of at times being extremely restrictive. I think these are issues that have to be worked through. I'm sure that people understand the reasons why many of these precautions have been taken. But it's certainly not with the notion of trying to deny or prevent legitimate academic exchange and study in this country, and which you I think rightly point out has been a source of tremendous benefit of our society and continues to be so.

**Question:** Ambassador, I teach intelligence analysis at Newman College outside of Philadelphia. I'm a member of IAIE, the International Association of Intelligence Educators.

We require all of our students to study Russian, Chinese or Arabic in our schools in order to get a degree in intelligence analysis. And you mentioned earlier that you anticipate that there will be as many challenges and changes in the next 15 years as there were in the prior 15 years. My question to you is, can you anticipate what the critical needs for languages will be five or ten years from now? Are we training people to have a cadre of intelligence analysts that will not fulfill the critical needs five years from now when they graduate? Can you anticipate other things that we should be training students in?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** I certainly think you've mentioned some of the key languages. I see that Bill Nolte's going to be speaking to you at lunch and maybe he can elaborate a bit on what we're doing to try, what the community as a whole is doing to try to anticipate these needs. But clearly we've fallen behind in this and think we need to redouble our efforts. I know those efforts are now getting underway.

I think Chinese and Arabic are clearly major requirements. I'd be reluctant to off the top of my head try to pick the other languages that I think might be needed. But again, I think it goes to the issue of generally encouraging students in our society to be interested in foreign cultures and in foreign languages.

My sense is that interest was a bit stronger in my generation than it has been in the last couple of decades or so. Hopefully with all that's happened we can do things to reawaken and encourage an interest in studying foreign language, foreign cultures and foreign societies because of the obvious point that our own existence as a country and as a society depends on, at least in large measure, on our part to understand and get along with the rest of the world.

**Question:** I'm a different kind of analyst. I'm a psychiatrist. [Laughter.]

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Can we see each other afterwards? [Laughter.]

**Question:** I have an hour open today. [Laughter.]

Actually, I'm an expert in spy psychology, so I have a particular interest here, and I've been in conferences where before [inaudible] I began to feel that the role that you were being envisioned for [inaudible] was almost like characters in the Wizard of Oz, where everybody had a big problem and they knew this DNI person would solve them all. But in reality -- [Laughter] -- you're a real flesh and blood person, you've been plunked into this really [inaudible] impossible job. Everybody wishes the best for you --

**Ambassador Negroponte:** It's driving me crazy. [Laughter and Applause.]

**Question:** How's 3:00 o'clock? [Laughter.]

How's it going? How is it jelling? How are you -- [Laughter.] I want to get a leg up on that.

**Ambassador Negroponte:** You're right. When I was first asked if I would be interested in taking on this job, the first thing I did was to go find the law, and when I pressed the button on my computer out came 271 pages -- just the first section that dealt with intelligence reform not with border security and everything else. And it's a challenging job, to say the least. It was the product of a lot of debate and compromise, different interests at work. But I think that when you take on a job like this you've got to try and prioritize.

The first thing you do is you identify good people to help you carry out the mission, and I believe we've succeeded in doing that, starting with an outstanding Principal Deputy in the person of General Mike Hayden who's probably one of the premier if not the foremost military intelligence expert in our government. So you've got to bring together a staff.

The next thing you've got to do is sit down with that staff and identify sort of areas for priority. The other thing is recognize that this is not something that's going to be done overnight. I referred to that in my speech. We're talking about a generational kind of a change, a lot of which has to do with culture and everything else.

So I've kind of boiled it down to focusing, myself, on focusing on about three things. Analysis and quality of analysis; building a sense of community; and the stewardship of the resources, the budget for the intelligence community. Those are my kind of three areas of concentration and focus.

How are we doing? Well, we're up and running. I think we're starting to have an impact. But it's going to take time. I don't think we should be impatient.

**Question:** Much conversation, much discussion preceded your confirmation on that resource management issue and your stewardship of it. Could you talk a little about how you have seen that role evolve and how management of DNI national intelligence budget is changing from DCI's old national foreign intelligence budget and management.

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Well, I don't think I can elaborate in great detail here. One point I'd make is that I think the genesis of this -- I think the creation of the DNI stems from two things. One was 9/11 and all the different studies and commissions that came after that, as a consequence of that. And secondly, I think there was, there has been a general sense, a fairly widespread feeling, that the Director of the CIA was, there weren't enough hours in the day for the Director of the CIA to both run the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and carry out his Director of Central Intelligence functions with the level of attention that that position required.

So I guess my first point in answer to you would be a sort of general one which is that with the creation of the DNI, and I do think we have more time, the staff that works for me, directly under my leadership, we have more time to work on those issues, and I think it's easier for them to get my attention, my concentrated attention on those budget issues than it might have been for the Director of the CIA. Because they are giving instructions at CIA stations around the world and following operations and managing the day-to-day activity of the CIA analysts the way that's being done. So I'd say we've been able to devote more time to it. And the second thing is, speaking of staff, I picked Ambassador Patrick Kennedy to be my Deputy for Management who is one of the most experienced administrative officers in the United States government. He was Assistant Secretary of Administration in the State Department for eight years; he helped set up the Coalition Provisional Authority of Baghdad; he helped me in Baghdad after that. He's an extraordinarily talented and versatile individual, so I think that under Pat's leadership you're going to see a really good effort by the DNI in the budget area.

**Question:** You're the first Director of Foreign and Domestic Intelligence, and these are areas that have grown and separated over the years -- too separated I think. How do you see them integrating in your role?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Well of course that's one of our main challenges, isn't it, to ensure that [inaudible] movement between foreign, military and domestic intelligence. Sometimes I think of it in a different way. I'd say international, national, and local would be another way of looking at it.

Foremost I'd say the creation of the National Security Branch of the FBI is an important step in this process and what we're hoping is that the FBI as a result will give more weight and a higher priority to the intelligence aspects of its work through such things as creating a better career path for FBI officials working in the intelligence area, to move away from the culture of making the case of prosecution being the most important element. And we want to do things that encourages that shift in culture. But of course with due regard for American civil liberties on the one hand,

and due regard for the proper law enforcement role of the Attorney General and the FBI on the other.

I think an important step in this direction has been now with the announcement of the creation of the National Security Branch that the Director of it is a career FBI official but his across-the-board deputy is going to be a career CIA official or is a career CIA official who came from the Counter-Terrorism Center over at the CIA. I think that's going to be a nice emblem, if you will, of the way forward.

**Question:** Would you address the issue of how do you see yourself purveying intelligence? Do you see the office just as a purveyor of classified intelligence? There are many issues like possible pandemics or agriculture or even weather that could impact on the President's decision in a lot of areas. How might this cause you to organize your office or seek to pass information forward?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Your question reminds me that I didn't answer the earlier question about an Open Source Center which if I could just for a minute address that.

I think the WMD Commission recommended the creation of an Open Source Center and the decision, we haven't reached it finally, but what we're looking at is to try and do something within the CIA itself where whoever runs that [inaudible].

As far as, I think your question goes to how we define intelligence, does it not? I think intelligence is -- I think our intent is towards a broader definition, which is useful for our broad decisionmakers. [Inaudible] is a good example. Various types of open source information of this particular topic of interest, the best information you can find on Subject X happens to be available from open sources we shouldn't hesitate to use it.

**Question:** [Inaudible]

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Well, I think that's going to be one of the challenges for the Open Source Center once it gets further along. And it reminds me also that I think in the area of economic analysis, sometimes a lot of the best economic analysis is out there somewhere in the journalistic or think tank world whereas probably it's in the national security area, the strictly security area where the government has a better monopoly on [inaudible] information. The whole spectrum.

**Question:** Sir, you mentioned, you likened the transformation of the intel community to what the military services went through in the wake of Goldwater/Nichols. Sir, to what degree is your staff looking at the lessons learned in that process with an eye towards helping our transformation?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Rather than answering the question why don't you let me take it as a suggestion. It's a good suggestion. Maybe there are people that are in my organization doing that already, but I hadn't thought of that. Thank you.

**Question:** As new technologies are popping out, especially software's and other technologies, they're coming at a rapid pace -- three months, six months, a year. However, the research process that integrates these into the federal government is still sort of an archaic Cold War, almost a 2-5 plus year [inaudible] process, which is great. But law enforcement agencies [inaudible] as they hit the market and use them, why is it taking so long to push emerging technologies into the federal government, and what can you do in your position to encourage speed in that process without losing quality?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Well again, I don't think I have a good answer to that question. Other than the fact that we've created the kind of institutional framework, if you will, where we should be able to address these kinds of questions. I'm thinking particularly of our Chief Information Officer, because in the area of information technology I suspect that's a significant if not a preponderant chunk of what you're talking about.

Of course there are science and technology components of virtually all of these agencies, and we've brought on board an excellent Director of Science and Technology, Eric Haseltine. So I think between our CIO and our S&T elements and their corresponding elements throughout the intelligence community, we should be able to make some progress in that area.

Some of the reality you've described is probably -- What one has to try to do, I suspect, is narrow the gap. I don't think you can overcome it entirely ever, but you've got to try to narrow it to the extent possible.

**Question:** A couple of minutes ago you mentioned that strength of analysis was a very high priority. What would you consider to be a sign of better analysis on Iraq?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Well, a couple of things. One I think the gentleman was asking me earlier about alternative analysis and so forth. I think that's better analysis, if you start incorporating varieties of views and alternative views. I think another important element of analysis is to put forward, and there's more of this being done now, clear statements about what it is we know and what we don't know. Intelligence gaps. And sometimes the way to knowledge is to start out by addressing what it is you don't or can't know. That's important.

And then I just think quality. Quality of writing, quality of thought process. Some analysis you can judge by the intellectual rigor with which it's presented. I think you can often identify how carefully it's been prepared.

So I think there are a number of different ways that -- And then of course ultimately the proof of the pudding is in the eating. You have the benefit of [inaudible] experience of seeing how good analyses have been or are.

I don't think of analysis as prediction necessarily, of what's going to happen. I'm not one of those who feels that our analysts have to predict the future. I think what they've got to do when you're talking about sensitive areas of the world or country analysis, you have to identify for the policymakers the really important factors at work in those societies that impinge on the decisions

that those governments, those elements are going to make. You don't necessarily forecast exactly what they're going to do.

I've about run out of time. Okay, we'll take two questions.

**Question:** I was wondering if you could share any comments on the challenges within the budget with the continuing war in Iraq and the natural disasters [inaudible] that area, as well as in the investment in science and technology [inaudible].

**Ambassador Negroponte:** The challenges we face because -- You're talking I think maybe about do we have competing demands on our time? I can talk a little bit -- and our resources. I think if I might limit myself on that first question to Iraq, I think we've got major challenges in Iraq, and probably the most important one, I think there's no analytical issue that is more important, no intelligence issue than understanding the nature of the insurgency in all of its aspects -- the insurgency and the enemy that we face, whether it's the international terrorist component, the Zarqawi/al-Qaeda component, or the more home-grown and domestic component within Iraq, the former regime elements and so forth. That I think is a source of, or an issue of constant interest and concern. There is a desirability, a thirst, really, to get as much fidelity about what is happening within the insurgency, and I think also a feeling that much more can still be done in terms of finding out what the nature of that insurgency is. It's a very very difficult issue. It's one that preoccupied me when I was out there as Ambassador and continues to be one of great concern to me in this new position.

On the hurricane, I don't profess to know all the different ways in which our intelligence might [inaudible] natural disaster, but certainly NGA deserves real kudos for what it did to provide coverage of those incidents and I think shows that our national intelligence assets can really be helpful in these kind of domestic situations.

I don't think that our international efforts suffered in any significant way or in any way as a consequence of our directing attention to those [inaudible].

The last question I don't think I quite got.

Since I have run out of time why don't I just ask the other lady for her question.

**Question:** Good morning. I work in the Information Sharing Program Office at the National Counter-Terrorism Center.

My question goes back to your comments about the mission managers. What are the responsibilities of the mission manager and what written authority enables that role?

**Ambassador Negroponte:** Uh oh. This sounds like a quiz. [Laughter.]

Let me say first of all that the National Counter-Terrorism Center I think is an excellent model of the kind of interagency cooperation and information sharing that we really want to achieve in the war on terror and I think it can be a useful model for similar efforts in other areas of endeavor.

When you go out to the NCTC you see people working from multiple agencies -- FBI, Homeland Security, CIA. I think it's an outstanding -- And all the different databases are available to people to work on.

As far as the authorities, the authorities are in part for the NCTC are stipulated in law, the law created it, and then of course the various directives of the National Security Council. But basically in my own lay terms without citing any regulatory authority chapter and verse, would be first I'd see them as a fusion center for intelligence on terrorism; and secondly, they have a mission to do strategic planning on how to conduct the global war on terror.

Let me just thank you for this opportunity. I was really encouraged most of all this morning by the large number of hands that went up. Obviously you've got many many questions on your mind. I think that's a sign of real interest and enthusiasm for this conference. So I hope you enjoy your day and find it useful, and thank you for putting me in your program.

[Applause].

[END]